Quarkslab、Cellebrite及Amnesty International等机构参与的技术分析指出,商业取证工具主要利用硬件启动链、可信执行环境(TEE)及安全元件(SE)中的漏洞来破解Android和iOS设备 1。在开机锁定(BFU)状态下,攻击者通过利用Boot ROM或预加载器漏洞破坏信任链,进而修补TEE以绕过凭证验证,从而对强度不足的PIN码进行离线暴力破解 1。具体而言,MediaTek芯片因存在不可修补的Boot ROM漏洞而极易受到此类BFU攻击,相比之下,配备独立安全元件(如Pixel Titan M)的设备在该状态下更难被攻破 1。根据Cellebrite 2025年2月发布的支持矩阵,针对搭载Titan M的Pixel设备,通常不提供BFU暴力破解能力,但AFU文件系统提取仍可行;GrapheneOS被认为能抵抗AFU提取 1。
当设备处于已解锁状态(AFU)时,CE解密密钥常驻内存且锁屏仅作为UI层存在,此时USB接口成为主要突破口 1。攻击者可通过内核驱动漏洞(如CVE-2024-53104和CVE-2024-53197)实现代码执行并提取数据 1。尽管Apple在iOS 11.4.1中引入的USB受限模式曾被Citizen Lab报告可通过CVE-2025-24200绕过,但后续补丁已修复该问题 1。为抵御上述攻击,建议用户在面临扣押风险时关机以返回BFU状态,启用iOS锁定模式,设置短时间的自动重启策略,禁用锁定时的USB数据传输,并使用高强度字母数字密码 1。
Commercial forensic unlocking tools rely on exploiting hardware and software vulnerabilities to bypass security measures on Android and iOS devices, according to a technical overview published by Quarkslab 1. The analysis details how attackers target the hardware boot chain, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), and Secure Element (SE) to compromise device integrity 1. Specifically, Before First Unlock (BFU) attacks involve exploiting Boot ROM or preloader flaws to break the trust chain, allowing for the patching of the TEE to circumvent credential verification and enable offline brute-force attacks against weak PINs 1. Conversely, After First Unlock (AFU) attacks are primarily facilitated by kernel driver vulnerabilities accessed via USB interfaces, such as CVE-2024-53104 and CVE-2024-53197, which enable code execution and data extraction because Content Encryption (CE) keys remain resident in memory while the lock screen functions merely as a UI layer 1.
Device resilience varies significantly based on hardware configuration and operating system design. MediaTek chips are particularly susceptible to BFU attacks due to unpatchable Boot ROM vulnerabilities, whereas devices equipped with dedicated secure elements like the Pixel Titan M are more resistant in this state 1. According to Cellebrite’s support matrix from February 2025, BFU brute-forcing capabilities are generally not provided for Pixel devices with Titan M, though AFU file system extraction remains feasible; however, GrapheneOS is cited as being capable of resisting AFU extraction 1. Apple’s iOS USB Restricted Mode, introduced in version 11.4.1, was reported by Citizen Lab to be bypassed via CVE-2025-24200, although subsequent patches have addressed this issue 1.
To mitigate these risks, experts recommend specific defensive protocols when facing potential seizure. Key strategies include powering off devices to return them to BFU status, enabling Lockdown Mode on iOS, configuring short automatic restart intervals, disabling USB data transfer while locked, and using strong alphanumeric passwords instead of simple PINs 1.
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