eMudhra认证机构在2026年10月20日披露了一起中间CA证书泄露事件1。该事件涉及8份中间CA证书的私钥被公开访问，其中P-384密钥存在严重生成缺陷，顶部376位全为零1，甚至有一个私钥的字面值仅为数字4（00000100）1。这些存在缺陷的私钥出现在2025年4月之后生成的证书中1。
尽管此次泄露影响范围广泛，但不同客户端所受威胁程度差异明显。采用强制证书透明度日志验证的主流浏览器（Firefox、Chrome、Edge、Safari）基本不受影响1，但许多非浏览器生态的客户端因不强制执行证书透明度要求，已有可能遭受攻击1。相比之下，资源受限的MCU（微控制器）设备由于采用精简的证书链和定制化信任存储机制，基本上不会受到此漏洞影响1。MCU设备通常存储容量少于1MB，仅存储单一根CA证书而非通用根证书包1，例如Zephyr RTOS样例仅包含GlobalSign Root CA一份证书用于连接google.com1。
A significant compromise of eMudhra's intermediate certificate authority infrastructure came to light on October 20, 2026, when private keys for eight intermediate CA certificates were publicly exposed 1. The incident revealed severe flaws in key generation, with P-384 keys containing 376 consecutive zero bits at the top, and one private key consisting of the literal value 4 (00000100) 1. These defective keys were present in certificates issued beginning in April 2025 1.
The impact of the compromise, however, varies considerably across different client ecosystems. Web browsers including Firefox, Chrome, Edge, and Safari have largely escaped exposure due to mandatory certificate transparency logging requirements 1. Conversely, many non-browser clients that do not enforce certificate transparency checking face greater risk of exploitation 1. Microcontroller units (MCUs) and other resource-constrained devices present a notably different threat profile, as they typically store less than one megabyte of certificate data and rely on individual root CA certificates tailored to specific use cases rather than comprehensive root certificate bundles 1. For example, the Zephyr RTOS sample implementation contains only a single GlobalSign Root CA certificate for connecting to google.com 1, insulating such devices from the broader PKI trust chain corruption that affects systems with more extensive certificate inventories 1.
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