互联网工程任务组(IETF)于2026年11月2日发布了关于“Merkle Tree Certificates”(MTC)的技术草案 1。该文档标识为 draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-08,有效期至2027年5月6日 1。这一提案由来自Google LLC、Apple Inc.、Cloudflare以及Geomys的工程师共同撰写,核心作者包括David Benjamin、Devon O'Brien、Bas Westerbaan、Luke Valenta和Filippo Valsorda 1。
针对传统X.509证书在短生命周期和后量子签名算法下面临的巨大开销问题,草案提出通过集成公共日志记录来解决 1。数据显示,若采用ML-DSA-44算法,两个SCT和一个叶证书签名将增加7,260字节的认证开销;若使用ML-DSA-65算法,该数值则升至9,927字节 1。为此,MTC方案建议由证书颁发机构(CA)维护仅追加的签发日志,证书结构由日志条目、包含证明和共同签名组成 1。
为了进一步优化体积,草案引入了“地标相对证书”机制,假设依赖方已预分发日志信息,从而避免携带签名 1。估算表明,若每小时分配一个新地标,地标相对证书的包含证明大小约为736字节,远小于单个ML-DSA-44签名的2,420字节 1。
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) PLANTS working group has released a technical draft titled "Merkle Tree Certificates" (MTC), aiming to address the excessive overhead associated with traditional X.509 certificates in the context of short-lived credentials and post-quantum signature algorithms 1. The document, identified as draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-08, remains valid until May 6, 2027 1. This proposal was authored by representatives from Google LLC, Apple Inc., Cloudflare, and Geomys, including David Benjamin, Devon O'Brien, Bas Westerbaan, Luke Valenta, and Filippo Valsorda 1.
The core motivation for this shift is the significant bandwidth cost introduced by post-quantum cryptography; specifically, the ML-DSA-44 algorithm adds 7,260 bytes of authentication overhead when combining two Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) and a leaf certificate signature, while ML-DSA-65 increases this burden to 9,927 bytes 1. To mitigate this, the MTC framework proposes that Certificate Authorities maintain an append-only issuance log, where each certificate consists of a log entry, an inclusion proof, and a co-signature 1.
A key optimization within the draft involves "landmark-relative certificates," which assume that relying parties have pre-distributed log information, thereby eliminating the need to carry signatures and significantly reducing certificate size 1. Under a scenario where a new landmark is allocated every hour, the inclusion proof for a landmark-relative certificate is estimated at approximately 736 bytes, which is substantially smaller than a single ML-DSA-44 signature of 2,420 bytes 1.
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