研究人员 Shubs 与 Sam Curry 近期披露了某大型汽车品牌(文中匿名称为“the automaker”)联网汽车基础设施中存在的严重安全缺陷 1。该漏洞涉及域名 redacted-telematics.com.au 和 redacted-identity.com.au,攻击者能够仅通过车牌号获取用户身份信息并重置密码,进而实现远程控制功能 1。在澳大利亚、美国和加拿大,这一攻击链最终可成功绕过多因素认证(MFA),生成有效令牌以执行解锁车门及启动引擎等指令 1。
此次攻击路径始于暴露在公网上的管理工具(admin tool),其 JavaScript 包中嵌入了 OpenIDM 管理系统的硬编码 API 密钥和管理员凭证 1。研究人员利用逆向工程 Android 应用,结合 WAF 路径遍历绕过技术(如 /static%2f..%2fopenidm/)以及 OAuth 流程中的资源所有者密码凭证(ROPC)流来跳过 MFA 步骤 1。完整的攻击链条包括:从车牌号定位 VIN,获取用户 GUID 及账户 PII,再利用管理员凭证绕过 WAF 并突破 MFA,最终调用远程命令 API 1。Sam Curry 在其博客中指出,针对美国、加拿大和欧洲的 OpenIDM 环境虽然存在更复杂的攻击链,但结果同样导致系统被攻破 1。研究人员强调,所有测试均在拥有或获得授权的车辆上进行 1。
Security researchers Shubs and Sam Curry disclosed severe vulnerabilities in the connected vehicle platform of a major automotive manufacturer, referred to in reports as "the automaker." 1 The attack targeted infrastructure associated with the domains redacted-telematics.com.au and redacted-identity.com.au. 1 By exploiting these flaws, an attacker could remotely unlock vehicles and start engines using only a license plate number. 1 These attack vectors were confirmed effective in Australia, the United States, and Canada. 1
The exploitation chain began with the discovery of an admin tool exposed on the public internet. 1 The tool's JavaScript package contained hardcoded API keys and administrator credentials for an OpenIDM management system. 1 Researchers utilized WAF path traversal bypass techniques, specifically targeting endpoints such as /static%2f..%2fopenidm/, to access the backend. 1 Inside the identity management system, they retrieved user Personally Identifiable Information (PII) linked to a specific Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), which was derived from the target's license plate. 1
A critical component of the breach involved bypassing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). 1 In the Australian environment, researchers found that MFA steps could be completely skipped by leveraging a Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) OAuth flow. 1 Sam Curry’s blog noted that while the OpenIDM environments in the United States, Canada, and Europe required more complex attack chains, the ultimate outcome remained the same: the generation of valid tokens allowing full remote control over vehicle functions. 1 All testing described in the disclosure was conducted exclusively on vehicles owned or authorized for use by the researchers. 1
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