安全研究机构Layer3 Intel与Synthient披露,白宫工作人员设备因预装住宅代理服务软件,导致其网络节点(AS2650)的IP地址被公开出租1。检测数据显示,在10月5日至11月3日期间,共有236次代理流量从白宫网络退出1。除俄罗斯背景的Infatica公司外,还有28个独立的住宅代理服务能够利用白宫网络出口进行流量传输1。
这一漏洞暴露了政府网络面临的严重隐私与安全风险。Layer3 Intel团队指出,这种访问权限是公共性的,“任何人都可以通过注册公开的住宅代理服务、支付几美元并通过它发送请求来获得这种访问权限”1。Synthient创始人Ben Brundage进一步强调,部分转售商以每GB低至60美分的价格出售带宽,“意味着不到一美元就能进入一些最机密和最受信任的网络”1。值得注意的是,主要涉及方Infatica的创始人Vladimir Fomenko曾运营关联2016年选举系统攻击的King Servers1。此外,Spur机构在2026年1月的一次网络研讨会中发现,近300个政府网络中存在类似的住宅代理现象1。
Security researchers have discovered that devices used by White House staff are inadvertently leaking their internet protocol addresses into the commercial residential proxy market, allowing third parties to route traffic through government networks. Layer3 Intel detected persistent proxy activity originating from the White House network (AS2650) between October 5 and November 3 1. An audit revealed that 236 proxy sessions exited via this specific government infrastructure during that period 1. This exposure suggests that personal or work devices belonging to White House personnel may be pre-installed with residential proxy service software, effectively turning secure government nodes into public gateways for paying users 1.
The investigation identified Infatica as a primary agent involved in this activity 1. The report noted that Infatica's founder, Vladimir Fomenko, previously operated King Servers, which was linked to attacks on election systems in 2016 1. Beyond Infatica, Layer3 Intel reported that 28 other independent residential proxy services were also able to utilize exit points within the White House network 1. Security experts warn that this vulnerability stems largely from free application SDKs embedding proxy capabilities, creating significant privacy and security risks for government operations while simultaneously facilitating potential malicious activities 1.
The accessibility of these compromised IPs is notably low-cost and open to anyone willing to pay. In an analysis, Layer3 Intel stated, "This is public access... anyone can register with a publicly available residential proxy service, pay a few dollars and send requests through it," highlighting the ease with which attackers can mask their identity using government-backed connections 1. Ben Brundage, founder of Synthient, emphasized that the financial barrier is negligible, noting that some resellers offer bandwidth for as little as 60 cents per GB, meaning "less than a dollar" can grant entry to some of the most confidential and trusted networks 1. This incident reflects a broader trend; in January 2026, the firm Spur discovered residential proxies present in nearly 300 different government networks during a webinar presentation, indicating that the issue extends well beyond the executive branch 1.
评论
还没有评论,欢迎留下第一条。