以色列超正统派兵役问题引发深刻社会分裂

以色列超正统派犹太人（哈雷迪）拒绝服兵役的立场与政府和社会之间的矛盾日益加剧，成为即将举行的大选核心议题。1超正统派传统上因从事宗教学习而被豁免兵役，但两年前最高法院已裁定该豁免实际上已失效。1随着超正统派人口持续增长，目前占以色列人口的14%，出生率远高于其他以色列人，若增长速度维持，到2050年他们可能占犹太以色列人口的三分之一。1政府每年向超正统派提供的补贴估计约为350亿谢克尔（84亿英镑）。1

民调显示在加沙战争期间，公众对征召超正统派的支持大幅增加。1然而，超正统派内部对兵役问题的立场存在差异。1拉比多夫·兰达乌表示宗教学生不仅不应服军役，甚至不应探望伤者或参加士兵葬礼。1联合托拉犹太党议员埃利亚基姆·施塔克将逃避兵役与大屠杀中对犹太人的迫害相提并论。1与此形成对比，新兴的哈雷迪公共党提议允许全职宗教学习者继续学习，其他人则应与其他以色列青年一起服役。1

兵役问题对内塔尼亚胡政府的执政联盟构成挑战。1其联盟目前民调约50-52席，需要60席以上才能在议会获得多数。1民族主义政党领导人伊坦·本·格维尔正在超正统派社区中获得支持。1

Israel faces a deepening divide over military conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews, a conflict that threatens to destabilize the government ahead of upcoming elections. The ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, population has traditionally been exempted from military service to pursue religious studies, but the Supreme Court ruled two years ago that this exemption has effectively expired.1 Now, as the Haredi community grows rapidly—currently representing an estimated 14% of Israel's population and projected to comprise one-third of the Jewish Israeli population by 20501—public anger over their exemption from military duty has intensified, particularly during the war in Gaza.

The controversy cuts to the heart of Israel's social contract and fiscal burden. The government subsidizes the ultra-Orthodox at an estimated 35 billion shekels (8.4 billion pounds) annually,1 while their refusal to serve in the military has sparked significant backlash. Public opinion has shifted sharply in favor of conscripting the ultra-Orthodox during the Gaza conflict.1 The political stakes are equally high: Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition currently polls at 50-52 seats but requires over 60 seats to secure a parliamentary majority.1 Netanyahu's political survival hinges partly on managing this dispute within his coalition.

Religious leaders have staked out uncompromising positions on both sides. Rabbi Dovid Landau stated that religious students should not only avoid military service but should refuse even to visit the wounded or attend soldiers' funerals.1 By contrast, a newly emerging Haredi public movement proposes allowing full-time religious scholars to continue their studies while requiring others to serve alongside other Israeli youth.1 Meanwhile, nationalist politician Itamar Ben-Gvir has begun gaining traction within ultra-Orthodox communities,1 signaling the potential for further political realignment. These clashing visions reflect a fundamental question about Israel's future national identity and social cohesion.