应援文化介入日本政坛："将高市早苗塑造为'偶像'"

日本首相高市早苗的支持者正通过借鉴明星粉丝的应援文化进行政治动员，将其塑造为政治偶像。1这一现象反映出互联网正在深刻改变日本政坛的选战格局，政策讨论逐渐被情感认同所取代。高市早苗的支持者被称为"追早苗"，参与者多为青壮年，对其的情感认同往往大于对政策主张的理解。1高市早苗出任日本首相后，其日常使用的托特包及圆珠笔等个人物品突然走红，甚至一度传出"卖断货"。1

在网络动员方面，视频制作者松井健在2025年自民党总裁选举期间透露，高市早苗的秘书木下刚志要求其制作视频抹黑竞争对手。1松井健每天利用人工智能软件生成一两百条视频，其中约70%用于攻击小泉进次郎，10%用于丑化林芳正，20%用于吹捧高市早苗。1与此同时，参政党等极右翼政党也积极利用短视频等网络渠道进行煽动性传播。12026年2月的众议院选举中，参政党议席数从2席大幅增加至15席。1此外，2026年9月13日冲绳县知事选举中，首次参选的古谢玄太获胜，现任知事玉城丹尼落败，竞选期间出现大量虚假信息和诽谤性内容。1

加拿大和平哲学中心主任乘松聪子指出，网络右翼与排外叙事的影响不仅局限于年轻人，中老年群体也深陷其中。1

Supporters of Japanese Prime Minister Takamichi Sanae have adopted tactics borrowed from celebrity fan culture to conduct political mobilization, repackaging her as a political idol through coordinated online and offline campaigns 1. This unconventional approach reflects how internet dynamics are fundamentally reshaping Japan's electoral contests, with emotional attachment increasingly displacing policy discourse 1.

The 2025-2026 political cycle has witnessed the extensive deployment of digital strategies to advance Sanae's political standing. Video creator Matsui Takeshi revealed that during the 2025 Liberal Democratic Party presidential race, Sanae's secretary Kinoshita Takashi requested the production of attack videos targeting rival candidates 1. Matsui reported generating between one hundred and two hundred videos daily using artificial intelligence software, with approximately seventy percent directed at attacking Koizumi Shinjiro, ten percent attacking Hayashi Yoshimasa, and twenty percent promoting Sanae 1. Sanae's supporters, who call themselves "Osenae" followers, skew toward younger and middle-aged demographics and often prioritize emotional attachment to her over specific policy positions 1. Following Sanae's appointment as Prime Minister, merchandise associated with her—including tote bags and pens she uses daily—experienced sudden commercial spikes, with some items reportedly selling out 1.

The influence of online mobilization extends beyond individual politicians. The far-right Sanseito party saw its lower house seats increase from two to fifteen following the February 2026 general election 1, and the party has leveraged short-video platforms for inflammatory messaging 1. In the September 13, 2026 Okinawa gubernatorial election, first-time candidate Kojo Genta won while incumbent Tamaki Denny lost, with the campaign marked by widespread false information and defamatory content 1. According to Norimatu Satoshi, director of the Canadian Center for Peace Philosophy, the influence of online right-wing narratives and xenophobic discourse extends across age groups, affecting not only younger people but also middle-aged and elderly populations 1.