国防大学教授马振坤在研讨会上指出，自2023年至2026上半年，共军约有28至30名上将、40至50余位中将遭拘留、开除党籍或长期缺席1。这一大规模人事变动严重削弱了共军的指挥能力1。尽管共军武器装备正在快速现代化，但高阶将领的清洗使得其真实战力低于表面呈现的有形战力1。
马振坤的研究指出，共军在台海、南海、东海等海域尚未出现由中央军委联合作战指挥中心主责、赋予行动代号的大规模联合军演1。2024年4月日本驱逐舰过台海后，共军东部战区宣布演训，但编队仅两艘作战舰，无补给舰随行，3天后即返航1。此外，2023年8月中国海警船与共军舰艇在民主礁海域相撞事件显示南部战区战术指挥及兵力调度存在问题1。这些案例反映出共军战区层级存在躁进作为和战术混乱1。马振坤警告，若共军不能克服这些无形战力限制，解放军在下一场战争中将付出高于预期的代价1。
Ma Zhen-kun, a professor at the National Defense University, presented research indicating that despite rapid modernization of Chinese military equipment, large-scale removals of senior officers have undermined command capacity, resulting in actual combat strength falling short of apparent military power.1 Between 2023 and the first half of 2026, approximately 28 to 30 generals and 40 to 50 senior colonels were detained, expelled from the party, or remained absent for extended periods.1
The purges have had tangible operational consequences. The Chinese military has not conducted large-scale joint exercises in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or East China Sea under centralized command from the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Center with assigned operational codenames.1 Following Japan's guided-missile destroyer transit through the Taiwan Strait in April 2024, the Eastern Theater Command announced training operations with only two combat vessels and no supply ships, returning after three days.1 Additionally, a 2023 collision involving Chinese Coast Guard vessels and military ships near Democracy Reef highlighted command and troop coordination problems within the Southern Theater Command.1
Ma concluded that the Chinese military's actual combat capability currently falls below the visible military strength it projects.1 He emphasized that without overcoming limitations in intangible combat factors, the People's Liberation Army would face higher-than-expected costs in any future conflict.1
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